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Thomas Zitelmann 
 
Introduction to the special issue ‘Horn of Africa’ 
 
 
he ‘Horn of Africa’ has a long-standing history of virulent and violent 
conflict. Therefore, it is of little surprise that most contributions to this 
issue deal with conflicts, but they also analyse how conflictive behaviour be-
comes channelled into institutions and collective representations. Maybe 
those among our readers, who long for good news from Africa, will be dis-
appointed. On the other hand, others may be dissatisfied exactly because not 
all conflicts are treated. This issue does not include any in-depth report on 
and analysis of the current stage of war in Southern Somalia, for example. 
Nor does it consider Islamist terrorists and stratagems in the Horn! The arti-
cles in this volume introduce micro-perspectives on conflict, institutions, and 
collective representations. Micro-perspectives on certain aspects may con-
tribute to a better understanding of wider issues. 
 
 
Macro- and micro-perspective on conflict 
 
A characteristic feature of the macro-conflict system in the Horn of Africa is 
‘playing the ball off the edge’ or, in other words, a policy of alliance that fol-
lows the motto ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The political classes of 
Eritrea and Ethiopia are experts of this policy, but it is also well known at the 
grass roots of kinship groups, clans and localities. In this volume Yasin Mo-
hammed outlines an Afar perspective on this pattern. International allies 
may provide arms and aid, as in the strategic partnership between Ethiopia 
and the United States, while at the same time, in early October 2007, oppo-
nents of the Ethiopian government were able to successfully lobby for the 
‘Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act’, a motion in favour of democ-
ratic freedoms in Ethiopia, in the US House of Representatives (Lyons 2008: 
160). The lobbying ‘Alliance for Democracy’ (AFD) includes contradictory 
Ethiopian exile factions, linking parts of the centralist Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD), the self-proclaimed winner of Ethiopia’s 2005 elections, 
with micro-nationalist organisations, like a wing of the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian Somali based Ogaden National Liberation 
Front (ONLF). Eritrea served as an external midwife for the AFD, offering a 
base area for political and military activity closer to home. At the same time 
Eritrea sanctions the Islamic shari’a courts of Southern Somalia, against 
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which the US supported Ethiopian invasion of this region was directed in 
December 2006. By allying themselves with the CUD, the OLF, and the 
ONLF they escaped the constant threat of being internationally outlawed as 
‘terrorist’, a goal the Ethiopian government tried to reach for more than a 
decade. ‘Networks of conflicts’ contribute to a regional conflict system, but 
where this ‘convergence of crises’ (Lyons ibid.) eventually leads to is unclear. 
So far we can observe an increase of violence and human suffering in some 
segments. Whether the AFD is more than yet another ‘opportunistic floating’ 
of factions and individuals towards an ‘alliance of convenience’, not unlike in-
ternal Somali alliances (Menkhaus 2007: 360), remains to be seen. 
The contributions to this volume switch perspective from the whole of 
the conflict system to some of its parts. From several micro-perspectives the 
articles deal with the background of institutions and collective political 
agency or representation involved in governance and conflict in the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and in the Republic of Somaliland, the de 
facto independent state on the territory of former Northern Somalia. Tobias 
Hagmann and Allemmaya Mulugeta describe and analyse post-1991 impacts 
of ethnic federalism on conflict, conflict motives, and institutional responses 
from a state-building perspective among pastoral populations in south and 
south-east Ethiopia. Yasin Mohammed’s contribution on the history of politi-
cal developments among the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea gives a strong sub-
jective voice to a related issue: the representation and institutionalisation of 
collective political agency among the Afar vis-à-vis the surrounding system 
of states. 
For the Republic of Somaliland, Marcus Höhne describes features of the 
freedom of press linking it to the particular experience of leading journalists 
as guerrilla fighters. Luca Ciabarri looks at the impact the refugee experience 
has on those Somaliland institutions that deal with external transfers (hu-
manitarian aid), like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Reset-
tlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and the Ministry of Planning. In 
contrast to Somaliland’s free press, the ministries linked to external transfers 
are rooted in the refugee experience of those Somalilanders who during the 
early 1990s were opposed to independence and fled to the neighbouring 
Ethiopia. These different experiences continue to live on in various social 
memories and are solidified into institutional set-ups. 
The articles contain good news in disguise. All articles are based on 
most recent field research, either from a perspective of micro-politics or of 
anthropology. The very possibility of such fieldwork indicates a condition of 
basic openness and security. Whatever one may think about the trials and 
tribulations of ethnic federalism in contemporary Ethiopia, which is one 
topic of this issue; nowadays facts and the critical analysis of developments 
are derived from well informed first-hand knowledge. Since 1991, this is a 
continuous trend, which has produced a body of literature that has covered 
Introdution 
 
7
different stages in the recent Ethiopian ‘politics of space’ (Clapham 2002).1 
This volume adds some critical notes and angles. Those who remember the 
conditions for social and anthropological research in socialist Ethiopia under 
the Derg (1974-1991), know and appreciate the difference between now and 
then. 
 
 
State, conflict, representation 
 
With regard to Ethiopia, the empirical field is overshadowed by  its legacy of 
empire and the myth of ‘the state’ being in existence for more than 2,000 
years. Hagmann/Mulugeta argue that the gradual incorporation of pastoral 
groups into the Ethiopian state contributes to a transformation of conflict 
motives. They also argue forcefully against primordial (what here stands for 
classical anthropological ‘structural-functionalism’) and environmentalist 
(‘neo-Malthusian’) positions that relate current conflict or violence among 
(agro-)pastoralists either to an unchanging social structure (clan, segmentary 
system) or shrinking natural resources and populations growth. Instead they 
concentrate on the interaction between state and local pastoral communities, 
under the conditions of ethnic federalism and decentralisation. Both aspects 
appear as state-sponsored vices that contribute to the politicisation of kinship 
structures, and by that to an endless ‘politics of difference’ (Schlee 2002).  
On the basis of politicised difference, new boundaries are drawn, creat-
ing territories that inhibit the necessary pastoralist mobility. Competition for 
natural resources is transformed into rivalry for state resources. Also collec-
tive violence is modernised. It still contains cognitive patterns of ritual and 
customary references linked to culture and social structure, but it is more a 
nostalgic allusion towards the pastoralist past.2 Yet the real conflict is about 
urban estates, electoral campaigns, and public budgets. Eventually this also 
allows ‘the state’ to interfere with local settings of the very institutions that 
should contribute to decentralisation. Mediation of ‘ethnic conflicts’ that de-
velops between the newly divided territorial units becomes a prominent 
means of state interference into local affairs. The authors’ argument is based 
on a well-chosen sample of literature and on their own research. The empiri-
cal data of this contribution is drawn from recent studies in Ethiopia’s Somali 
region (see also Hagmann 2005) and among Karrayu (-Oromo) herders in the 
                                            
1  See Cohen 1994, Abebe/Pausewang 1994, Emminghaus 1997, Serra-Horguelin 1999, 
Aalen 2002, Pausewang/Tronvoll/Aalen 2002, Keller 2002, Asnake 2004, Merera 2004, 
James et al. 2002, Schlee 2003, Turton 2006, Hamer 2007, Chanie 2007, Lefort 2007, Smith 2007.  
2  See my own perspective on social myth and stages of the symbolic revival of the Oromo 
age- and generation-grading Gada system among Oromo nationalists before and after 1991 
(Zitelmann 1991, 1996, 2005).  
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Awash valley (Mulugeta). While I basically agree with the dynamics Hag-
mann/Mulugeta outline, I shall add below some words on the relation be-
tween ethnic federalism and decentralisation, about the fine differences be-
tween ‘nations’/’nationalities’ and ‘peoples’ in the Ethiopian political dis-
course, and about the analytical potential of structural-functionalist and cog-
nitive positions.  
Yasin Mohammed describes in his article the more recent history of po-
litical representations among the Afar, whereby lineage, clan, generation, 
and territorial units mark division lines that eventually reappear under the 
manifold acronyms of fronts and parties. The account is subjective in particu-
lar with regard to the historical narrative employed. The Afar are one of the 
major ethno-linguistic groups within Ethiopia that have received their own 
‘regional state’ (kilil). They are Muslim and they are pastoralists. But Afar are 
also a divided population that lives partly in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and in Dji-
bouti. The dimension of political Islam is briefly touched with reference to 
‘strategic minorities forgotten by the regional and international community 
(who) might turn to al-Qaeda’ if their grievances are further disregarded.  
The Afar are an example of how contemporary ethnic federalism is 
rooted in pre-1991 political structures. The Afar were the only ethnic group 
that was granted self-administration under the Derg, in return for co-
operation with the central government. Yasin Mohammed describes this de-
velopment. The current armed Afar opposition against the Ethiopian gov-
ernment, known as ‘Ugugumo’ (a neologism for ‘revolution’) has its roots in a 
revolutionary militia that fought under the Derg against the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF). Fissions and fusions mark the processes towards 
political representations among the Afar. It is difficult to disregard the logic 
of a segmentary system as source of such a process. 
Yasin Mohammed mentions one conflictive field that Hagmann/Mu-
lugeta have not considered. Institutionalised or informal transfers between 
generations are of central interest in these societies. There exists a high his-
torical awareness of generation and succession. It concerns the interplay be-
tween external agencies and internal conflicts about succession. The divided 
Afar have several neighbouring ‘external agencies’ they can turn to in case of 
need (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and at one stage also Somalia). This 
multiplies the possibilities for acronymic representations, based on politi-
cised kinship, territory, and generation. 
The political desires forwarded by Yasin Mohammed, ‘true decentrali-
sation’ for Ethiopia and accommodation with multiculturalism in centralist 
Eritrea, indicate that a constructive critique of current ethno-federal practices 
in Ethiopia needs some utopian spirit.  
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Institutions, experience, memory 
 
In the Somaliland case, ‘the state’ does not have the mythological depths that 
its Ethiopian counterpart has. For the Republic of Somaliland, the different 
legacies, sources, roots, and interests that contribute to ‘the state’ are trace-
able in the immediate environment. 
Somaliland seceded from the Republic of Somalia in 1991. Internation-
ally the Republic of Somaliland is not recognised, but the country is de facto 
independent. The internal affairs of Somaliland are fairly efficiently handled. 
The country has a working democratic system, based on power sharing be-
tween the administration, elected institutions, and clan-based councils. Ad-
vocates of ‘good governance’ give much credit to Somaliland’s achievements. 
Not all the clans that settled on the territory of the Republic of Somaliland 
were in favour of independence. Ciabarri traces the legacy of the Somaliland 
ministries that deal with ‘extraversion’ – in the sense outlined by Bayart 
(1989) – of the refugee experience of those Somalilanders, mainly belonging 
to the Gadabursi clan, who fled in 1991 to Ethiopia, because they did not 
agree with the new system. The border camp of Darwanaje became an ex-
perimental ground to learn of all the virtues and vices dealing with interna-
tional emergency aid that were also characteristic for the refugee camps in 
1980s Somalia. ‘Humanitarian entrepreneurs’ brought the camp experience 
with the aid-system to the home areas, following the UNHCR sponsored re-
patriation of the refugees in 1997. Ciabbari speaks of a ‘social memory’ that 
links different ‘generations of camps’ and influences institutional attitudes. 
He makes an interesting point, which deserves more research, looking into a 
social genealogy of institutions.  
Höhne follows a similar track. For him, the free press in Somaliland car-
ries the legacy of the guerrilla fighters who fought for independence with the 
Somali National Movement (SNM), mainly based on the Ishaq clan. The free 
press is an uncompromising supporter of Somaliland’s independence, even 
falling back on mere propaganda if independence seems to be endangered. 
The cases Höhne presents deal with the press reaction on the Somaliland-
Puntland (the semi-independent eastern part of remaining Somalia) border 
conflict in 2003/2004, which the author experienced at the frontline. This en-
abled him to compare local facts to journalistic fictions. Another example 
provided by Höhne is the dealing of the press with attempts of northern eld-
ers to take part in reconciliation processes in the South. Each attempt is re-
garded as a potential threat against the principle of Somaliland’s independ-
ence from the South. The initial stability of Somaliland during the early 1990s 
was based on negotiations between an armed movement (SNM), pro-
independence elders of the Ishaq, and anti-independence or neutral elders of 
other clans. These different environments with various stakeholders did not 
vanish. They nourish the public institutions of Somaliland. Tiny shifts in the 
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once negotiated compromise can easily contribute to more basic political re-
visions. However, that this can be documented, as Ciabarri and Höhne do, 
indicates the relative stability of such institutions. 
The Republic of Somaliland is longing for de jure recognition, even 
though it could lose external aid. Since Somaliland is internationally not rec-
ognised, the country receives aid under an international humanitarian aid 
regime. A de jure recognition would change this into a linkage with the ac-
tors of the international development aid regime. The Ethiopian experience 
shows that those internal actors who could not cope with such a change in 
1991 failed in the longer run.3  
Ciabbari makes creative use of the older literature on the socio-
economic and cultural settings of refugee camps in the Horn of Africa. He 
sees these camps as places of political and social production that contribute 
to the social history of the region. One aspect that was overlooked during the 
1980s are the remittances from the diasporas. In her short research note to 
this volume Cindy Horst describes remittance practices and social expecta-
tions attached to them (short-term survival vs. long-term investment in edu-
cation) for Kenya’s Dadaab camp, which link the camp economy and refugee 
livelihoods to the wider Somali diasporas. Indeed, if, as Ciabarri argues, the 
1980s were a decade were ‘the state’ by its rather strong refugee administra-
tion, learned to handle (use, misuse) international public emergency trans-
fers, current global trends seem to contribute to a privatised attitude ‘along-
side the state’. However, social memory linked to generations of camps may 
include tricky illusions and twists. During the 1980s, the informal remittance 
techniques, also known as hawala, were, as far as my memory goes, used by 
the NGOs and the agency staff to overcome the difficulties of changing the 
US-$ into the Somali Shilling. ‘Actors beside the state’? Yes – but who’s ex-
perience, memory, and legacy? 
 
 
Ethnic federalism, nation or nationalities vs. peoples, conflict 
management 
 
Hagmann/Mulugeta, who deal with the influence of the Ethiopian state on 
pastoralist populations in the Somali and Oromo lowlands are uneasy about 
the deliberate or collateral impacts of the entanglements between state and 
social units linked in their traditional environment to extended kinship struc-
tures (lineage, clan) or age- and generation-grading. They indicate that this en-
tanglement has a history dating back to imperial times, but they concentrate on 
the recent past, after ‘ethnic federalism’ has entered the scene in 1991. There is 
                                            
3  For an insiders complaint about this development see (Leenco Lata 1999: 119-141). 
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a tendency to blur ‘ethnic federalism’ with ‘decentralisation’. Likewise, po-
litical concepts for human aggregates like ‘nations or nationalities’ and ‘peo-
ples’ are used as if they mean the same. From my perspective they can not be 
used synonymously. In the Ethiopian political discourse the terms transport 
crucial differences. Taking Ciabarri’s idea about the genealogy of institutions 
in Somaliland as an argumentative frame, I think it is worth to trace the his-
tory and contents of current administrative practices and concepts. Ethnic 
federalism is a political project that grew out of the need to hold a heteroge-
neous empire together. Decentralisation describes a bundle of tools for gov-
ernance offered by the international regime (practices, discourses) of devel-
opment and ‘good governance’. How such aid bundles are locally unpacked, 
how they are adapted to the political project of ethnic federalism, are usually 
negotiated or contested issues. The population-related concepts used within 
the project of ethnic federalism mirror longstanding differences between 
shades of Marxism, of macro-, and micro-nationalism, which have their roots 
in the history of the liberation fronts that came to power in 1991. Since refer-
ence to such roots became increasingly outdated, a selective ‘tools approach’ 
towards ideas offered in the global market for decentralisation, ‘good gov-
ernance’, and ‘conflict regulation’ began to replace the earlier discourse and 
institutional practices of control. Institutions of low intensity democracy os-
cillate with low intensity violence and warfare.  
The experiment with ethnic federalism started in summer 1991, after the 
fall of the socialist and centralist military government. In July 1991 a make-
shift national conference took place, called in by the new rulers and an un-
easy coalition of numerous ‘national liberation fronts’. The conference agreed 
on a National Charter, a Transitory Parliament, and a schedule for regional 
and national elections. Excluded from the conference were pan-Ethiopian 
forces in opposition to TPLF. Participating groups that claimed ‘ethnic’ rep-
resentation had often no strong social basis. Makeshift independent ‘Na-
tional Liberation Fronts’ and ‘People’s Democratic Organisations’ (PDOs), 
linked to EPRDF, mushroomed. The National Charter stressed the validity of 
the UN Convention on human rights, including individual and collective 
rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples. The Charter was not an agreed 
on law. It was a memorandum of good intentions. The National Charter pro-
vided TPLF/EPRDF with some legitimacy, with ad hoc local allies for a 
power monopoly, and an agreement on a federal state based on ethno-
linguistic units. With the consolidation of its powers, allies and regional 
forces started to challenge the hegemony of TPLF/EPRDF and their PDOs. In 
1991-1992 the newly created Oromiya Regional State was streamlined due to 
pressure and violence. In 1994-1995 the Somali regions (now Somali Regional 
State) were streamlined, but to a lesser degree than among the Oromo. The 
first elections in 1992 as well as all the following elections were neither free nor 
fair.  
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Ethiopia has more than 80 ethno-linguistic groups. Only a few received 
newly created regional states (Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, Afar, Somali), in 
other cases (Southern Regional State, Gambela, Beni Shangul & Gumuz), 
several groups were joined together, each with their own ethno-national sub-
regions or districts. On nearly all levels among farming and pastoralist popu-
lations the new boundaries were locally contested. In some cases, enterpris-
ing individuals started to redefine local varieties of cultural practices or 
speech into fundamental differences, to make claims for self-administrated 
ethno-national space. Sometimes such processes developed from the grass 
roots; sometimes they were sponsored by the ruling party or by opposition 
forces. In many cases regional states or sub-regions developed internal fron-
tier policies to guard against their neighbours, using internal resettlement 
strategies not unlike earlier governments did from the perspective of the cen-
tral state (Schröder 2004).  
The constitutional and legal process, which had started with the July 
conference and the National Charter, culminated in 1995 in a constitution 
that defined ‘... the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia’ (Pream-
ble of the Constitution) as the components of the sovereign of Ethiopia. The 
much-contested Article 39 of the constitution allows for the secession of these 
components: ‘Every Nation, Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has an un-
conditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession …’. 
But there is no agreed on definition of nation, nationality, and people. 
EPRDF/TPLF made their position very clear: Nation and nationality stand 
for units that include ‘class’ and class-divided interests. ‘People’ stands for 
the working ‘masses’. EPRDF/TPLF and their allied People’s Democratic 
Organisations were to defend the rights of the masses, who, according to a 
revolutionary logic, do not have an interest in class-based secession politics. 
This type of revolutionary logic defined the central state’s and core party 
EPRDF/TPLF’s interventionist strategies towards regional and local affairs 
during the 1990s, reaching its low-point in several purges. Locally, the 
purges encountered generation conflicts, in which for each post of a dis-
missed bureaucrat or party official, a young, educated, and eager cadre 
queued up. See e.g. the fate of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation 
(OPDO), its founding generation, and its newcomers. During the later part of 
the 1990s, ERRDF/TPLF tried to capture the development discourse as part 
of its revolutionary differentiation between ‘them’ (narrow nationalists, 
class-based interests, anti-people) and ‘us’ (with the people, development-
minded).4 
As Yasin Mohammed shows in this volume for the Afar, the foundation 
of an allied PDO was not always an easy process for EPRDF/TPLF. Often 
                                            
4  This logic was outlined in early 1997 in EPRDF's party paper Hizibawi Adera ('People's 
Appeal'), Vol. 4 (7), December-January 1996-1997 (Zitelmann 2005: 143). 
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people of low status were attracted, which shows how issues of class and 
also gender (women who had fled to TPLF to escape from forced marriage) 
were part of the spectrum leading to ethno-political representation within 
EPRDF/TPLF. In the case of the Afar, EPRDF/TPLF never captured and 
streamlined the political processes that developed out of the segmentary, 
generation-based, and territorial order of the Afar pastoralists. The same was 
true for the Somali region, with its clan-based legacy. Even when EPRDF/ 
TPLF was able to create administrative allies, they were not able to control 
the processes inside the parties permanently. Eventually it was the pastoral-
ist lowland areas (Afar, Somali, Gambela) and the borderlands towards the 
Sudan (Bela Shangul & Gumuz) were the centralist techniques of control by 
EPRDF/TPLF did not work.  
Global decentralisation strategies, mediated by the international devel-
opment regime, helped EPRDF/TPLF to overcome an impasse in the control 
of the lowlands. This involved, as Hagmann/Mulugeta show, from 2001 on-
wards the newly established Ministry of Capacity Building. In the year 2003 
the regional states of Afar, Somali, Gambela, and Bela-Shangul & Gumuz 
were declared to be ‘peripheral regions’ that came under the remote control 
of a newly established Ministry for Federal Affairs. ‘Peripheral regions’ be-
came defined by ‘underdevelopment’ (predominance of pastoral production) 
and a high degree of inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic factionalism, i.e. clan struc-
tures (Vaughan/Tronvoll 2003: 49 f.). The ruling PDOs in the ‘peripheral re-
gions’ were excluded from the core institutions of the EPRDF, while those of 
Tigray, Amhara, Oromya, and the Southern State remained attached to it 
(ibid.: 123 f.).  
One institution that sidelines the Ministry of Capacity Building is the 
Ethiopian Civil Service College, which started in the service of the ruling 
party. Ironically, as Yasin Mohammed shows, education-and-generation led 
to a new acronymic party among the Afar, formed by students of the Ethio-
pian Civil Service College, which was not well received by the EPRDF and 
was forced to join the recognised PDO.  
Conflict transformation, regulation, and prevention became a highly 
valued currency in the official representation of Ethiopian politics.5 Hag-
mann/Mulugeta mention, how elders of the region of the Karrayu-Oromo 
pastoralists, with mediating capacities under the age- and generation-
grading gada system, are brought into government and NGO-sponsored 
workshops being paid per diems, to learn about ‘commercialised peace-
                                            
5  A recent document for the official perspective on the 'peripheral regions' , the definition 
of conflicts, and conflict transformation, is Government of the Federal Republic of Ethio-
pia/UNDP Ethiopia (2007): Strengthening National Mechanisms and Capacities for Conflict 
Transformation. For the Period from May 2007 to April 2008. Addis Ababa (>http://www. 
et.undp.org/dmdocuments/Prododc-57610.pdf<).  
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making’. By and large Hagmann/Mulugeta develop a critical perspective on 
the avoidance of statutory law and justice, while cases regulated according to 
customary practices seem to mushroom. They include this into the catalogue 
of vices of state-sponsored ethnic policy in the pastoral lowlands. This is a 
difficult issue. Hagmann (2007) has his own experience with the integration 
of elders into local, state-framed politics of Ethiopia’s Somali Region. On the 
other hand, mediation strategies by elders, linked to issues that can disturb 
local peace, can also develop from the ground, as Andrea Nicolas (2007) has 
shown in her recent dissertation, based on three years of intensive fieldwork 
in a mixed Oromo-Amhara peasant neighbourhood south of Addis Ababa. 
Elders deal with cases of insult, theft, homicide, abduction of young girls (for 
marriage), adultery, collective violence, and land issues turning to proce-
dures and solutions based on customs. But custom is at the same time recap-
tured or reinvented. Under previous regimes other agencies than the elders 
were vested with local mediation powers (nobility and land owners under 
the imperial regime; institutions of the peasant associations under the social-
ist regime). If the mediation is successful, state agencies may seal the agree-
ment (for instance in cases of homicide), but the state does not interfere with 
the mediation procedure, neither do political parties. We need more knowl-
edge, based on in-depth fieldwork, on how mediation based on customary 
law and procedures works, where it fails (in cases of asymmetric conflict 
partners, land issues, public goods), and where it interacts with the state and 
other agencies that contribute to legal pluralism.  
It is open to question whether non-statutory local legal practices or me-
diation procedures in Ethiopia could be per se related to ethnic federalism. I 
rather see a relationship between EPRDF/TPLF’s outdated ‘democratic cen-
tralism’ of the earlier years, and the new globalised policy think-tank termi-
nology and toolbox practices under the heading ‘governance as conflict man-
agement’. ‘Commercialised peace-making’ or, using a trope coined by Richard 
Rottenburg, globally ‘travelling models of conflict management’, contribute 
to the entanglement between the central state and the localities. The channel-
ling of conflicts through institutional set-ups makes them more predictable 
and less violent (Elwert 2004). This normative wisdom from anthropological 
conflict research includes also a second message. What is needed to make 
such channels efficient are institutional pluralism and an openness to name 
the issues of real or assumed disagreements about interests and intentions.  
Wherewith is conflict and conflict behaviour – violent or less violent – 
related to in the ethno-federal setting of Ethiopia? Hagmann/Mulugeta con-
centrate on the current relation between conflicts, public goods, and eco-
nomic assets defined as ‘new resources’. They dismiss the environmentalist 
concentration on conflict motives, which is highly prominent in the official 
Ethiopian discourse. They disregard the autonomous character of kinship 
organisation (or segmentary structure) as a basis for conflict behaviour, but 
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stress the current interrelation between state institutions and kinship organi-
sation. They likewise dismiss autonomous cognitive patterns for conflict and 
violence. Recent anthropological findings from the patchwork of ethnic 
groups in southern Ethiopia, edited by Ivo Strecker and Jeanne Lydall (2006), 
confirm that ‘the state’, its institutions, and human agency belong to the 
landscape (not just now, but since the troops of Menelik II occupied the 
area). A continuous element in the state-locality relationship, deeply en-
shrined in cognitive patterns and social memory of the ruled and the rulers, 
is the tension between asymmetric and symmetric power relations among 
occupants and locals, i.e. practices, symbols, and feelings of superiority and 
inferiority, which the population of the Ethiopian South experienced since 
the late 19th century. These findings show also, that the contradictions 
within segmentary structures (based on age, gender, status) renew the nego-
tiation practices between ‘the state’ and local groups for each generation.  
Conflict patterns in classical segmentary societies do not follow a con-
frontational automatism determined by ‘structure’. Conflicts can be mediated 
or processed by crosscutting social relations (Gluckman 1956) and by rhetoric 
(cognitive) strategies that invoke more peaceful or more violent tactics. Here, 
as Strecker (1999) has shown for the Hamar, the employment of the cognitive 
register is linked to age, generation, and succession, i.e. to the chances of 
young men to become an ‘elder’.  
 
 
Post-imperial politics and its Islamic other in the Horn of Africa 
 
If one maps the ‘peripheral regions’ vis-à-vis the other federal states of Ethio-
pia, one can observe a remarkable similarity between the shape of the Ethio-
pian empire under emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) during the early 1890s 
vis-à-vis the yet marginal or still un-occupied territories in the lowlands. 
Does the current self-representation of the central government as an arbitra-
tor of ethnic conflict, suggest a continuity of an empire in disguise? Ethiopia, 
if not an empire, is post-imperial in the sense that past structures of a central-
ist state (imperial, socialist) have an impact on social memory and agency. 
Social memories are manifold. Ethiopians and other populations, but also po-
litical institutions in the Horn of Africa are ‘battling with the past’ (Triulzi 
2002) and its different legacies and interpretations. The post-imperial politics 
of Ethiopia finds an Islamic other in Somalia’s shari’a courts.  
The examples used by Hagmann/Mulugeta have a bearing on aspects 
of the wider network of conflicts. In the pastoral lowland areas of Ethiopia, 
the Ethiopian central state interferes as the supreme arbitrator in cases of 
conflict and as mediator of development and the flow of aid. This policy in-
cludes an asymmetric and paternalistic attitude towards the pastoralist 
populations. In mere economic terms, pastoralist systems in the region can 
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well flourish without ‘the state’, as Peter Little (2003) has shown for the So-
malia-Kenya borderlands. But economy and material wealth represent only 
one aspect of the issue. Law represents another one. The Somali revival of 
customary clan law during the 1990s, concomitant with the vanishing of the 
Somali state, had its limits in dealing with contested public goods (overland 
roads, airfields, ports). Security was the scarcest public good. The Islamic 
shari’a courts have one root in the need to find legal solutions in dealing with 
public goods in absence of a state supported security.6 Added to this were 
the rhetoric and practice of Pan-Somalism and Jihadism, which contributed 
its own radical ‘politics of difference’ to the current situation in Southern 
Somalia. From this perspective, the Ethiopian state and Islamic shari’a courts 
in Southern Somalia compete on a related functional level. On the other 
hand, the Somaliland examples show that pastoral societies are very well 
able to construct public institutions in their own right. 
For Ethiopia, ethnic federalism opened new venues for negotiations be-
tween ‘the state’ and local groups. Within these units, groupings based on 
kinship, age, gender, generation, religious affiliation, or friendship – each 
with its own cognitive particularities – may find different reasons and path-
ways to link up with external agencies. Even if we agree on the ‘new re-
sources’ as a central conflict motive under the current conditions, we cannot 
be sure either about the bundled tensions and motives behind or about the 
segmented employment of cognitive conflict strategies. Even crosscutting so-
cial relations that mediate conflict may change from generation to genera-
tion. Conflict management, sponsored by the international aid regime in 
ethno-federal Ethiopia, is a version of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998). Fields 
of ignorance are surveyed and ordered in a schematic and reductive mode, 
and created are illusive perspectives on predictable channels for local ten-
sions and conflicts.  
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